Reconfiguring an Ideology

Connecting the pieces. This seems to be an entrance into a new level in our analysis of meaning and our relationship to individualized perceptions of meaning. The course study began with an unconscious level of association with signifiers (Bourdieu and Lacan). Yet, now the specimen under review is the strategic acceptance of particular signifiers and the complexity entailed by conscious acceptance-choice-agency through recognition. And I like this. It reminds me of a chess game. An increase in the level of expertise does not yield a higher short-term memory capacity, but rather, the bits of information are unified so that one bit contains many different patterns and thus more information per bit. Therefore, a chess player can postulate what the other player will do and already strategize her or his next three moves if that one move is taken because there is a recognized pattern. This level of conscious decision indicates recognition of the ideology at hand. When one recognizes the ideological scheme, she or he can chose whether or not they want to take the position of what Althusser would call the Subject of the ideology. So, there is a choice in interpellation. The choice is how one responds to the hailing and how conscious she or he is about the “Subject” position of the ideology. In a patriarchal society, the Subject of the ideology is reserved for a man (and all accompanying masculine qualities deemed by society as masculine and superior). The woman could hypothetically identify with the position of the man, but this identification is not complete and contradictory, because her attainment of the “Subject” position in the ideology renders its collapse. Therefore, how can women exist or have power within a patriarchal ideology?

In “The Power of Discourse and the Subordination of the Feminine,” Luce Irigaray explains, “The issue is not one of elaborating a new theory of which woman would be the subject or the object, but of jamming the theoretical machinery itself, of suspending its pretension to the production of a truth and of a meaning that are excessively univocal” (796). Therefore, the solution is not to create an entirely separate ideology for the existence of women in society. Rather, since women are the masters of mimicry (both created from man in a Biblical sense and perpetuator of mankind in a childbearing sense), women can mimic the patriarchal ideology, yet secure a sub-space that contradicts the entire set of ideas and allots power to women. Changing ideological mindsets takes time, but recognition of the ideologies existence is the first step. This is a classic case of turning the tables- stacking the deck- playing the system- securing a loophole. Irigaray explains, “Which does not mean that it lacks style, as we might be led to believe by a discursivity that cannot conceive of it. But its “style” cannot be upheld as a thesis, cannot be the object of a position” (797). Irigaray establishes that “the style resists,” demonstrating that the style, the subspace in the patriarchal ideology, is slowly diminishing its power by resisting. Therefore, Bourdieu’s observations of taste could be debatable. What happens when an individual accepts an ideological position, attains an excess of qualities that are aside from the subject set, secures a subset in that ideology that uses an association of taste in order to destroy the entity that perpetuates such tastes? Highly ideological ideologies are the most difficult to pinpoint according to Althusser. However, what if an ideology slowly becomes more recognizable and recognition lends itself to power in choice, will the ideology continue to be pervasive in the material existence of society?

I am not sure that my analysis is correct in what Irigaray was attempting to convey. I may have used her argument in a way that tangents away from the essence of her argument- I did not even delve into the discourse aspect. Nonetheless, her writing inspired this line of thought on my own behalf.

-Kaylie Fougerousse

The Ideology of Ideology

I focused on Althusser instead of Fiske. Mainly because I always have a lot to say and wanted to focus in on one. Althusser in my opinion is putting the “I” in Ideology.

Ideology Defined | Interpretation of Illusion = Reality

Louis Althusser was a structuralist, Marxist philosopher who sought to re-construct the existing understandings of ideologies, in Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, and move away from the previous notion that ideologies where forms of false consciousness. Instead, Althusser suggested that the proper definition of an ideology is “a set of practices and institutions that sustain an individual’s imaginary relationship to his or her material existence” (693). Therefore, Althusser approached the explanation of, or ideology of ideology by examining (1) the object represented and (2) the materiality of existence. Althusser explained that “world outlooks” are imaginary since they do not correspond to reality (693). But, Althusser argues that admittance of the former sentence suggests that ideologies constitute an illusion and thus simultaneously an allusion to reality. This allows interpretation to be the discoverer of the reality of the world behind an individual’s imaginary representation of that world (693). Althusser focuses on the materiality of existence, because thoughts and individual belief systems are reflected in “material” actions. Actions repeated over and over lead to practices. Practices put on repeat yield rituals… and voila, you have an ideological apparatus based in the materiality of existence of actions.

The Initial Question

The main question arises, “Why do men ‘need’ this imaginary transposition of their real condition of existence in order to ‘represent to themselves’ in their real conditions of existence?” (694). Why does society encompass ideologies? The two prevailing answers to this question rest with an explanation regarding The Church (Catholic Church) in past times and Marx’s support of a Feuberbachian idea of alienation. (1) The Church used an ideological structuring system to organize their power and dominion over the masses of people to justify exploitation. The ideological apparatus served as a platform to structure a falsified representation of the world, which was imagined by the masses, enslaving their minds and allowing the leaders of the Church to dominate their imaginations. So what we have here is The Ultimate Mind Game. (2) The second answer, according to Marx, was that men construct an alienated and imaginary representation of their conditions of existence, because the conditions of existence (themselves) are alienating. So, in other words, two negatives make a positive. It is like saying, “I will alienate alienation (itself) to find my identity and stability in my own condition of existence.” And you could get into some stoner-esque philosophy here: the tension when an allegorical symbol contradicts itself through acting against itself. (Scandal condemning scandal- a warning against itself- page 696).

Individualized Ideologies

But… Althusser says, wait a minute… It is NOT the conditions of existence that are important, but the INDIVIDUAL’S RELATION to those conditions of existence, that is what constitutes an ideology. So, Althusser individualizes the Marxist view by explaining that an individual subject constructs an ideology, not a collective group. It is the individual’s relations to conditions of existence that formulate individual ideologies.

Interpellation

Althusser explains, “Ideology hails or interpellates individuals as subjects” (700). This makes sense. We each view the world through our own perspective. We are very self-centered, because that is our perspective. We form understandings through our acceptance or dismissal of knowledge acquired. Throw in a vague shout out to Bourdieu, but with a dash of agency and you get Althusser. The ideologies, which we form, are self-centered entities- because they constitute our relations to existence in society. In addition, we are “always-already” positioned in a way to take on the role of Subject within an ideological apparatus. The main difference between Bourdieu and Althusser is that Bourdieu binds people to the embodied social structure.

The Ideology of Ideology

Ideologies are like hipsters. An ideology never says, “’I am ideological’” and a hipster never says, “I am hipster” (700). That is what is so cool about studying the concept of an ideology as an ideology itself. It is important to note that those who fall under an individualized, ideological mindset believe themselves to be outside of the ideology. Even though individuals who are hipsters fall under the ideological apparatus of what is entailed by being hipster, they believe they are not victim to the categorization of that ideological apparatus. But… we all know. Same with the ideology of ideology. Now, I feel obligated to call Althusser out. While I think his theory is intriguing, I believe there are collectively perpetuated ideologies that are reinforced throughout history. Althusser claims “ideology has no history” (698). What I think he means is that since the individual creates ideologies, the only history of an ideology is bound to the subject… but I think there must be a collective component somewhere that explains practices of inception and the practices of The Church example. Unless he is saying an ideology has no history, but ideological apparatuses do? Food for thought.

Helpful Quotes

“His ideas are his material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which derive ideas of that subject” (697).

“Ideology hails or interpellates individuals as subjects” (700).

“The subjection of the Subject [secures ideological formations]” (701).

-Kaylie Fougerousse

A Twisted Relationship

This was such an interesting and complicated marriage- feminism and psychoanalytic phallocentrism. I really did not understand how these two literary criticism lenses tied together until Mulvey explained that psychoanalytic perspective could shed light onto the oppressing forces against women (feminist creed). Nice set up. When reading, I was first intrigued by the internal contradiction- the paradoxical relationship of the woman and man. Freud would say that women desire to be men due to penis envy. And Karen Horney is turning in her grave. Yet, Mulvey makes a valid point. Let’s say that women do envy a penis because they lack one. Therefore, they are inferior to man. Yet, without the woman’s ability to bear children, there would not be any penises in the world. Therefore, there is an internal contradiction between the absence of what she envies and her necessity of existence to potentially create a being that has what she envies but can never herself have. So, things get complicated.

Mulvey goes onto explain that, “Woman then stands in patriarchal culture as signifier for the male other, bound by a symbolic order in which man can live out his fantasies and obsessions through linguistic command by imposing them on the silent image of woman still tied to her place as bearer of meaning, not maker of meaning” (29). Let’s dissect this. To review, a signifier is a sound-image- a letter- the label- the carnal nature of the text. The signified is the concept- the unconscious realm- the spirit- transcends text because it is of the mind. Woman, according to Mulvey, is a signifier that labels Man, the signified. By identifying and positioning ourselves in relation to Woman (the signifier), we are implicitly, unconsciously understanding ourselves in relation to Man, according to Lacan’s theory. Therefore, everything, all our identities derived from the signifier are phallocentric and conducive to a perpetuation of a patriarchic society. The unconscious mind is the maker of meaning in psychoanalytic theory (but it is inaccessible, so we can never fully understand meaning). We associate with labels- signifiers- in order to bear meaning or attempt to make advances in understanding meaning.

I was all-good, until I remembered being introduced to Thomson J. Hudson’s theory of the duality of mind. I read something awhile back about the concept that there is a thing called “mental gender.” This theory suggested that every mind has an objective (active, voluntary, and conscious) male component and a subjective (passive, involuntary, and subconscious) female component. And when there is anything involving consciousness, I immediately think Freud and the iceberg and psychoanalysis. If this theory exists, it contradicts Mulvey’s sentiment. The theory of mental gender would suggest that the Woman is the signified. By identifying with Man as a signifier, we are given insight into our relation to the unconscious signified, Woman (or maybe even subconscious- which on a side note, where would subconscious fit into the linguistic sign? In the bar between the signifier and signified?). I guess Mulvey was saying that due to our patriarchal society, men are given the ability to create and construct meaning using women as a label to represent something that is lacking but yet necessary for the production of superior offspring. But, I wonder if this theory could be flipped or read a different way, maybe women understand their relation to Man (a signifier) in a way that limits the extent of their creative power. Or, maybe something can be skewed in the process of identifying with a signifier. Also, saying the Woman is the signifier- the letter (the carnal nature) is interesting in itself. I haven’t read the entire Mulvey piece yet, so this may be way off track, but these are my initial reactions. Would have been cool to tie in Derrida’s perspective to these dualistic theories, but I should stop typing.

-Kaylie Fougerousse

Crash Course

I thought I would make a crash course post. I am probably leaving some things out, but this is basically a reflection of all the major take-aways thus far… according to me. And, yes this is subjective. I think teaching is the highest form of learning. So if I had to teach a class on what we have covered so far, it would go something like this:

Introduction

Make it personal. If you want to learn something and retain it, make it personal. Pretend that these guys are people you know. Find random things that make them more human, that take them out of the distant theorist group. Find your inspirations, find your colleagues, and find your opponents. This will make understanding theories and theorists so much easier. Maybe this will help someone on the exam.

The Defense of Posey by Sir Philip Sydney

I’d like to think Sir Philip Sidney is endorsing The Beatles, which is probably entirely inaccurate. He probably would have thought The Beatles were poet-apes in suits, but roll with the analogy. He says that “poesy therefore is an imitation, for Aristotle termeth it in the word mimesis— that is to say, representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth— to speak metaphorically (“I am the Walrus” and “While My Guitar Gently Weeps”), a speaking picture (“Penny Lane”), with this end to teach and delight (“All You Need is Love” and “Baby You’re a Rich Man”). I would give George Martin and The Beatles an A+ any day in a “teacheth and delight” course. But, let’s be fair, The Monkees get an A+ in mimesis and imitation. Sidney claims that poetry- expression in language serves a purpose- it urges creation- it urges action, since it teaches.

La Distinction by Pierre Bourdieu

Bourdieu is like this awesome sociologist who complicates the influences of nature and nurture. He is all about Taste, but creates a Catch 22. He says we are totally influenced by society and culture, but our cultural tastes reflect our position in the social hierarchy of classes. If you do not like classical music, well then you are probably just not upper class. You are denying what has been denied to you. If you do not like Barthes… well that is probably because he is too smart for you and you resent him for that, so you say you don’t like him. But the problem here is that there is no agency. Maybe you just don’t like classical music or maybe you just don’t like Barthes and it has no reflection on your social class. There is no variability in Bourdieu’s theory. Because Monet and Renoir were not accepted in their time… impressionism… really? That is just blobs of paint- that isn’t art. Guess what? 150 years later those impressionist paintings are a form of high art. So what does that say about taste revealing social status? …

The Pleasure of the Text by Roland Barthes     

That little yellow book. Barthes is such a rebel. He is such a Frenchman (and I am stereotyping)- longwinded, lyrical, makes sexual feelings seem in line with reading texts. He just writes to write. The page is a catch-all for his thoughts- they are not linear, but splattered and diverging and unorganized. But I love him. He claims that pleasure is found in the familiar, within our comfort zones. He says that jouissance or bliss results in a discrepancy between what we know and what we learn. So, unlike Orwell’s 1984 line “ignorance is bliss,” ignorance is actually not bliss, but rather an ingredient for bliss to occur. Because once that ignorance is shattered with revelation, bliss is experienced. There is a loss in bliss, a loss of ignorance, a loss of the former understanding, but that loss is a sort of high. If I were a neuroscience graduate student, I think it would be cool to see if pleasure reading releases dopamine and blissful reading releases norepinephrine and epinephrine in the brain… like is there actually a neurotransmitter difference between pleasure and bliss… but I’m not a neuroscience grad student. Barthes says that a text can be perverse- without function- beyond the confinements of utility.

“Beyond the Pleasure Principle” by Sigmund Freud

Freud experimented with cocaine, thought everything was sexual, and based his research on unstable clients… but his early work as a neurologist was really cool. He was the Father of Psychoanalysis. Freud’s motto: “The Unconscious Mind is Full of Repressed Memories.” He was all about being in love with your mom if you were a boy and in love with your dad if you were a girl. Nuns thought they could throw off his theory, but he would claim they are fixated in the latency period of psychosexual development. Freud claimed that beyond the pleasure principle, there is a desire for mastery over situations that we have no control over. Therefore, we put ourselves through pain to elicit a sense of superiority or some could say pleasure (but it is really beyond pleasure) from controlling what once or what does control us. Power problems.

A Course in General Linguistics by Ferdinand de Saussure

Saussure… just makes me think of a teacup and saucer. But, anyway, he played in the field of Structuralism. He says there is parole and langue (even though I think parole is a part of langue, we won’t go there). Parole is the sentence level deployment, the context matters. It is communicative and social. Langue is the system or structure of language. Langue is synchronic- it occurs at one point in time, case-by-case basis. But… parole is diachronic- it develops over time (socially evolves). Saussure says there is a signifier (sound-image) and a signified (concept) in the structure of language. He says the concept exists before the sound-image. The sound-image is assigned to the concept. This would make sense given the development of thought and language. Children who cannot speak yet can often understand the concept of “no” or “happiness” without expressing these signifier words. Also, we understand things through binary relationships (opposites-synonyms and antonyms). We understand something only in light of what it is not.

The Two Aspects of Language by Roman Jakobson

Roman Jakobson was born in Moscow so he has a really cool name. Jakobson contributed to phonology and to the distinction between syntax and semantics. He claims there are two aspects to language. The first is metonymic, syntagmatic, adjacent, displaceable, and dealing with continuity (x axis). Metonymy is the signifier- a part that is taken for the whole. Then, there are metaphoric elements that are paradigmatic, replaceable (like synonyms), to be substituted, and dealing in relations of similarity (y axis). Spotlight: Figurative Language. Just think: Metonymy= part taken as whole and Metaphoric: the synonym and you got this.

“The Instance of the Letter” by Jacques Lacan

Lacanian Readings. Then, there is Lacan… the French Freud… which sounded terrifying to me. The stereotype of the French is a lot more sexually explicit, so you can only imagine a French Freud. But yeah. He has two really important thoughts that need to be discussed. First is the mirror stage, which is basically this internal contradiction of existence. If it seems deep, that is because it is. There are three main points: (1) language acquisition influences the mirror stage, (2) apprehension or worriment of oneself is distinct, and (3) the mirror image is the IDEAL self that co-exists with feelings of inability or incompetency. Coolest thing Lacan says: Whenever we put something into language, there is always a loss- an insufficient representation of the true feeling or accompanying state of being. Lacan challenges Saussure and says, “Hey, the sound-image (the signifier) is necessary to understand the concept (signified).” The sound-image, the signifier is a symbol, a “letter.” Therefore, in existence we function alone and together. Language (the system of signifiers) is what enables collective understanding and expression. Therefore, it is necessary for social existence (hence gendered bathroom symbols/letters example). While I get this, I still think the concept (signified) exists before the letter, the sound-image, and the signifier… but that’s just me.

Swing Dancing With Continental Philosophy

Deconstruction and structuralism (which is what de Saussure contributes to) both fall under continental philosophy. In addition, hermeneutics also falls under continental philosophy (as opposed to analytical philosophy). In all three, the common factor is language.

Hermeneutics basically sets the foundation that language is the fundamental basis of the humanities. Although tied to Biblical interpretations, it can also apply to the interpretation of language in general (Maas). A step further, deconstruction is a critical theory that suggests that the only way to extract an absolute truth or stable meaning is through pure presence in a text (Derrida 19; 99). However, this is impossible due to the factors that influence a man and thus his individually constructed interpretation. Therefore, nothing is pure and nothing has a stable, universal meaning that can be interpreted (neoclassical poets would not be happy with this sentiment). The archetypal critical lens would argue something very different.

I dappled with some philosophical views last semester and this summer. My conclusion: almost everything seems paradoxical in nature… and this is why writers and psychologists go crazy. The deeper one researches, the more the circles interweave. But confusion is a state of higher consciousness, or so I’ve been told.

Most of our understandings are understood through binary relations (and many systems have internal contradictions). De Saussure calls this “a two-sided psychological entity” in language comprehension or a sort of reciprocal determination that is much more complex than a “sound-image” compilation (61). He also states, “In language, there are only differences” (70). Therefore, it is often that one makes sense of something by understanding its opposite.

Even within de Saussure’s theory, he traps himself. First, he says that in the separation of language and speech, there is inherently a separation between the social and the individual (de Saussure 59). Then, he explains that both are socially influenced. If I might be so bold, I believe de Saussure’s flaw is that he sees language as separate from speech. If one is to think of language as overarching, with oral speech and written expression as branches, the study of semiotics might be clearer. He later attempts to describe language in terms of synchronic and diachronic notions (59; 65). De Saussure writes,

In a game of chess an particular position has the unique characteristic of being freed from all antecedent positions; the route used in arriving there makes no difference; one who has followed the match has no advantage over the curious party who comes up at a critical moment to inspect the state of the game; to describe this arrangement it is perfectly useless to recall what had just happened ten seconds previously. (65)

Most of us can probably see what point is trying to break free here. Language, in essence, is both socially constructed and inherited, but individually perceived and expressed (ta dah: language is synchronous (in the present) and diachronic (integral in the process)). However, cognitive psychologists, especially recent research on expertise (of which chess is a primary study), the context does matter… synchronous language then can be understood within a diachronic approach- which I think de Saussure was trying to say, but confused in his analogy. Or at least, I hope. The chess moves give clues to patterns. Patterns give insight into expertise. Expertise takes approximately ten years to develop. Hence, everyone in our class is an expert of our language (even though we may not feel like it). Furthermore, if one could recognize binary understandings and break free from the extremist tendency, there might be a lot of revelation in understanding the work of the spectrum. De Saussure had interesting thoughts and that should not be discredited. There is merit in his work. [Yet, structuralism was limited. It was not until the birth of cognitive psychology that structuralism and functionalism collaborated.]

-Kaylie Fougerousse

Works Cited

De Saussure, Ferdinand. “Course in General Linguistics.” Literary Theory, an Anthology. Ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan. 2nd ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998. 59-71. Print.

Derrida, Jacques, Alan Bass, and Henri Ronse. Positions. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1981. Print.

Maas, Anthony. “Hermeneutics.” The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 7. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1910. 24 Sept. 2014 <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07271a.htm&gt;.

A Probably-Too-Long Post on Barthes

This is a compilation of several thoughts from last week. I usually like reflective journals, so then no one actually has to know how much I write. But, oh well.

It is standard propriety to offer forth a resolution to the counterargument- to the questions a listener or reader might ask. This is standard in entry-level debate. When one constructs an argument, when one tries to convey a point, one must be sure to anticipate what the receiver will offer in response.

My argument is that Barthes offers a mere template, but the reason that his thoughts can only go so far is due to the pervasive influence of culture and time on the perceptions of the individual. Therefore, all that can ever be given on understanding the pleasure (and bliss) of a text is at a very basic template level. Just as snowflakes are alike and unique simultaneously, so can be a reader’s response to a text.

So, I ask myself: Why does the distinction between bliss and pleasure matter? Does each not elicit some form of meaning- some form of response- some form of existence? Why then, do we further categorize things into categories? Is this a cultural phenomenon? The Western mind more readily understands angles than it does circular forms. Why is this? Why are we more vulnerable to (some) optical illusions due to the architecture and educational influences of our upbringing? Can this analogy apply to reader interpretation of text? Is it possible that the accustomed civilization has become a template for which we view the world in a limited- perhaps linear fashion? Can we view Barthes text in a more lateral fashion- could pleasure and bliss mingle in the spreading of each? Is it the parallel concept of pleasure and bliss that limits our understanding? Can one piece of text elicit pleasure for one and bliss for another? Can time influence as well? And this is how my mind works, what I have before me are research questions that could easily comprise a book. So, let me focus on the first four questions.

Why does the distinction between bliss and pleasure matter? Distinction changes the course of understanding. If bliss and pleasure are on the same spectrum, then there are more grey areas. If bliss and pleasure are parallel, then I must ask what defines each and at what moment do they shift- jump paths? Does each not elicit some form of meaning- some form of response- some form of existence? Both do. Why then, do we further categorize things into categories? To establish a template- a common ground understanding- a baseline. Is this a cultural phenomenon? Definitions of what is pleasure and what is bliss influenced by the individual reader who is influenced by culture.

Let’s break down Barthes’ argument. There is life. Life is existence. However, in existence, we seek meaning. Meaning defines life. Text is a medium that offers meaning (Barthes 36). There are two very broad and overarching principle aesthetics that one experiences through reading. The first is of recognition (the pleasure principle). The second is of exploration (the bliss principle). Each can work together, but cannot entirely be the same thing. For this reason, Barthes calls them “parallel forces” (20). Therefore, they can run along side simultaneously in one piece of text. However, the reader can only run one path at a given time. With this being said, the text holds the potential to be both pleasurable and blissful. It is the reader that determines the meaning and defines the experience. Whether the enjoyment is attained through a consistency of self or a loss of self, is what deciphers the distinction (Barthes 14).

Francis Bacon wrote in Novum Organum,

For it is a false assertion that the sense of man is the measure of things. On the contrary, all perceptions as well of the sense as of the mind are according to the measure of the individual and not according to the measure of the universe. And human understanding is like a false mirror, which receiving rays irregularly distorts and discolors the nature of things by mingling its own nature with it… For everyone (besides the errors common to human nature in general) has a cave or den of his own, which refracts and discolors the light of nature, owing either to his own proper and peculiar nature, or to his education and conversation with others, or to the reading of books, and the authority of those whom he esteems and admires; or to the difference of impressions, accordingly as they take place in a mind preoccupied and predisposed or in a mind indifferent and settled, or the like. So that the spirit of man (according as it is meted out to different individuals) is in fact a thing variable and full of perturbation, and governed as it were by chance. (1678)

Therefore, trying to peg what text is pleasurable and what text is blissful can only be reliant on the individual who is in a variable state due to other influences. In class, we spoke of pleasure in relation to familiarity. We defined it as comfort and a safe spot that gives us identity. However, bliss is the result of risk-taking, discomfort, and revelation (Barthes 14). Revelations sometimes shatter our former thoughts and shake the foundations of our beliefs. Someone once warned me that the farther I went into academia and the farther I stepped out of my comfort zone seeking knowledge, the higher prices would come with gained wisdom, for every wisdom has its price- its consequence- both good and bad. Yet, I yearn to have both pleasure and bliss. I want a safe haven. I seek certainty. However, I am intrigued and drawn to seek new things and new experiences- to discover things that have always been there, but I never saw or perhaps I never saw them in such a light before. It is the circular rotation of repetition that secures both pleasure (familiarity) and bliss (a new angle- a different perspective). Interesting to contemplate.

-Kaylie Fougerousse

Works Cited

Bacon, Sir Francis. Novum Organum. The Norton Anthology of English Literature. By Stephen Greenblatt. Vol. B. New York ; London: W.W. Norton, 2012. 1678. Print. The Sixteenth/The Early Seventeenth Century.

Barthes, Roland. The Pleasure of the Text. Trans. Richard Miller. New York: Hill and Wang, 1975. Print.

A Symbiotic Relation

I really love Bourdieu’s thought process in Distinction. I believe he reflects several other philosophies, namely Immanuel Kant’s work. I can also see a parallel between an excerpt from Sir Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum. The idea that knowledge, thus meaning, is in part innate in the form of subconscious templates (knowledge a priori) from which one constructs a subconscious and conscious understanding of social hierarchies, be that age, gender, socio-economic status, etc. through social interactions and experiences is brilliant. While I could delve into many areas for discussion, I wish to highlight Bourdieu’s reference to “’logical conformity’” and what he describes as everyone, “condemning themselves to their lot” (241). I must question then, is this a negative occurrence since it perpetuates a social hierarchy? Further, does this still occur today and in what ways? Class markers are becoming more blended with the increasing self-identified people of the “middle class.” If conformity is tied to the need for belonging, which ties directly to personal identity, is logical conformity a positive or negative move? Conformity has a negative connotation, but collective action seems more positive. However, this perpetuation of a cycle by embracing a niche of belonging within the social hierarchy is a little less black and white and a little more gray. Perhaps, gray areas elicit pleasure for they seem to be teeming with meaning. Perhaps then, meaning and pleasure have a symbiotic relationship. What do you think?

-Kaylie Fougerousse